

1970
YEAR
STAMP

SECURITY
N.B. T
UPGR

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) *JR*
Date *29/4/71*

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

RESEARCH

FILE No. *RR 6/14* (Part)

TITLE: RESEARCH - MIDDLE EAST
SETTLEMENT
THE KURDISH IN IRAQ: COMPARISONS BETWEEN
THE 1966 AND 1970 PROPOSALS

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

Mr. Paul
Cyeloodynia
MCS
Cyeloodynia

1

24/3
2/4
6/4
7/4

FCO 51/147
CLOSED

6c
1048

Registry Address

RESEARCH REGISTRY
ROOM 612
RIVERWALK HOUSE

SECURITY GRADING

N.B.
UPG

YEAR STAMP

1970


NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PART

RR 6/14

FILE No.

Mr. Paul,
Research Department.



Kurds in Iraq

As you know, on 11 February the Baath regime in Iraq announced an agreement, apparently in thirteen points, with the Kurds.

Many of the heads of the agreement appear nearly identical to some of Dr. Bazzaz's ill fated "twelve points" of 1966. It would be most useful to us if your section could compare the two Iraqi Government statements of 1966 and 1970 to see what points they have in common and where they differ significantly.

The recent telegrams from Baghdad have been copied to your department but you may find the attached copy of a communique given us by the Iraq Embassy a useful reference paper.

As the Department here are under considerable pressure from enquirers about the recent agreement and its historical background might I ask you to let us have at least a provisional analysis in say ten days time?

S. L. Egerton
(S. L. Egerton)
16 March, 1970

Mr. Egerton (NED).

I attach herewith a preliminary draft as requested, and should be grateful for any comments you may have.

I should be grateful also if you would let us know how many copies of the final draft will be required.

1. Mr. Heindel *for word. PLUM*
2. Mr. Paul (Research Dept). *20/3*

A. Paul

A. Paul.
Middle East Section
Research Department

Very succinct, to the point and useful. I have ventured an addition or two, to underline the Iranian 20 March, 1970.

interest in not having a lasting settlement. (I realise this was not asked for, but I think it needs bringing in).

2. 12 copies of final, please. May I assume you will copy to all posts in the region RESTRICTED Wton, Paris, Moscow and Geneva and UNHCR New York? *20/3.*

SECRET

Reference... Dec 6/14

(2)

Mr. Fox

The Russian Settlement: comparisons between
the 1966 - 1970 Proposals.

1. Attached herewith the final
draft of this pp. which was
completed at the request of N.S.D.
(see Mr. Egerton's minutes played).

2. It was intended originally as
an ad hoc minute for the use
of the Dept. but now, however,
wishes to give it a wider distribution.

3. Subject to any amendment by the
pp. is now ready for printing,
since the Dept. require it urgently.
I suggest that it should be
cyclostyled & distributed as
quickly as possible. A Distribution
Sheet is attached.

A. E. A.

Michael Easton

24 March 1970

Approved for
distribution

J.F. 2/4.

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

[Handwritten signature]

The Kurdish Settlement: comparisons between
the 1966 and 1970 Proposals

1. Introductory Background

When Dr. Abdel Rahman Bazzaz became Prime Minister of Iraq in 1965 the Kurdish war had been in progress for some five years, and it was one of his main objectives to bring it to a close as soon as possible. He was unable to take the initiative, however, until after the failure of yet another attempt by the Iraqi army to crush the rebels in the spring of 1966, and it was not until early in June that contacts were made with Barzani and that conditions favourable to talks were established. There were then a number of visits by delegations in which views were exchanged, and finally Barzani sent a message to the Prime Minister in which he indicated a wish to come to terms. Dr. Bazzaz responded by broadcasting on 29 June a programme for "restoration of normal conditions in northern Iraq" which he summarised in twelve main headings (the Twelve Points).

The impression created by his declaration was that it was a blueprint for an eventual settlement rather than a settlement in itself, that much of its phraseology was ambiguous and that a great deal had been left unsaid. It was felt, nevertheless, that as long as Bazzaz remained in office there was a fair chance of progress, and the Kurds seemed to be reasonably satisfied with the proposals which Barzani welcomed as contributing towards the achievement of peace. By mid-July, however, a reaction had set in, and the Kurds were becoming increasingly disillusioned by lack of any positive signs of implementation, and when Bazzaz was dismissed on 6 August

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Scut*

hopes of a settlement virtually disappeared. The Kurds accused the Government of having gone back on the Bazzaz proposals, difficulties appeared in the reinstatement of Kurdish officers, and the Government dragged its feet over Kurdish local government while for its part suspecting that Barzani was not playing straight over surrender of war material, particularly that captured from the Iraqi army. By October there was a stalemate with no further progress likely. Neither side trusted the other and both made frequent allegations of bad faith by the other. Thereafter the position deteriorated steadily with a gradual relapse into further hostilities. Renewed fighting on a considerable scale was reported in January 1967.

The war continued inconclusively into 1970, early in which year it was reported that new contacts had been made with the Kurds in an attempt to reach a settlement. It was known that the Government was increasingly concerned about the morale of the large forces tied down in the north, at the ever increasing expense of the war, and the apparent inability of the Army to force a decision. It was believed, however, that these attempts had been unsuccessful, and the announcement of a settlement on 11 March came as something of a surprise. The proposals published by the Government on 12 March follow those of 1966 fairly closely. Once again a blueprint has been produced: it remains to be seen whether present conditions are more favourable to its implementation than those of 1966.

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Scut*

2. The Proposals

1970

The Published Terms

1. Kurdish language recognised officially on a parity with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority.
2. Acceptance of Kurdish participation in the Government and in all Government departments without discrimination. Officials in Kurdish areas to be Kurds or Kurdish speaking.
3. Educational and cultural services for Kurds to be implemented and expanded.
4. Right of the Kurds to have their own "popular organisations".
5. Reinstatement of all former Kurdish military and civil officials, students and workers.
6. Establishment of a Kurdish development commission with an adequate budget.

1966

Abdel Rahman Bazzaz's Twelve Points

Kurdish to be recognised as an official language side by side with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority, and with Arabic as the language of instruction in those areas. (Bazzaz 3.)

All public offices and appointments open to Kurds on a proportional basis including ministerial, judicial, military and diplomatic posts. (Bazzaz 5.)
Local officials to be Kurds if sufficient available. (Bazzaz 7.)

Kurds to have a fair share of educational grants etc. University of Baghdad to give facilities for study of Kurdish literature, language, etc. (Bazzaz 6.)
Minister to be appointed for supervision of rehabilitation with control of administrative, linguistic and cultural affairs affecting the Kurds. (Bazzaz 11.)

On return of parliamentary life a measure of freedom of expression and political organisation to be permitted within the law. (Bazzaz 8.)

On termination of hostilities and acts of violence all Kurdish officials and employees to be reinstated in their former posts, including also dismissed workers. (Bazzaz 9.)

A special body, answerable to a Minister, to carry out rehabilitation and development, including tourism, tobacco growing and afforestation. (Bazzaz 11.)

7. Preparation of a special economic plan for the Kurdish region.
8. Rehabilitation of Kurds and Arabs driven out or affected by hostilities. Relief measures for housing and employment to be put in hand.
9. The agrarian reform law to be speeded up in Kurdish areas.
10. Amendment of the interim constitution to confirm the existence of two basic nationalities, Arab and Kurd.
11. Appointment of a Kurd as one of the V/Presidents.
12. Measures to be taken to secure Kurdish national rights and autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic.
13. The exploitation of national wealth in the autonomous area to be the responsibility of the Republican authorities.
14. Kurds to have representation in the legislature in ratio to the population figures.
15. The Kurdish broadcasting station and all heavy weapons to be surrendered.

-

Funds now being spent on the war to be devoted to Kurdish rehabilitation. (Bazzaz 11.)

The Government will endeavour to rehabilitate all individuals and groups in their former places of habitation with a return to the status quo ante as far as possible. (Bazzaz 12.)

-

Kurdish nationality is recognised by the interim constitution, but to be re-emphasised in the forthcoming permanent constitution. Recognises two main nationalities with equal rights and obligations. (Bazzaz 1.)

-

Recognition of Kurdish rights by decentralisation to administrative units with wide powers in local and municipal affairs through elected assemblies. (Bazzaz 2.)

-

Kurds to be represented in the National Assembly on a proportional basis as defined in the new electoral law. (Bazzaz 4.)

All members of the armed forces and police to report to their units. Other armed bodies will be considered as under Government authority and will hand in their weapons in the course of rehabilitation. (Bazzaz 10.)

3. Comment

TDZ
Secret
source

Of the fifteen clauses in the 1970 proposals eleven are repetitions in slightly different form or with slightly different emphasis, of those of 1966 (see Annex). It is reported, however, that the Kurds are satisfied that they are an improvement on 1966, and Barzani is on record as having said that they had secured all their demands saving only their own flag, a fixed share of the oil revenues and representation on the Revolutionary Command Council. He is said also to be hoping for at least four Ministries in a reconstituted Government. It is possible also that there has been agreement on measures not made public, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Iraqi troops, the retention of the Pesh Mergha as a National Guard in the Kurdish areas and the abandonment by the Government of support for Talabani and his followers.

✓

The 1970 proposals do appear to be less vague and rather clearer cut than those of 1966, though there is still much in them which is ambiguous. They contain also four clauses which are not in Bazzaz's Twelve Points. Of these that on the exploitation of national wealth makes it clear that the Kurds are not to enjoy the exclusive benefits of oil exploitation in Kurdish areas; the others, dealing with an economic plan, agrarian reform and appointment of a Kurdish V/President do not add up to any great advance on 1970 from the Kurdish point of view. The gain from the latter appointment is likely to be more prestigious than real, agrarian reform has never been an important issue in northern Iraq, and the economic plan will depend entirely on allocation of funds and executive staff.

SECRET

The most important clause is that (No. 12) in which the Kurds are to be granted autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, which appears to make possible the eventual establishment of autonomous areas under Kurdish local administration, thereby satisfying the Kurdish demand for a separate Kurdish province.

4. Conclusion

It now remains to be seen whether the agreement can be implemented, or whether, as in 1966, inaction, mistrust and different interpretation of imprecise phraseology will lead to gradual failure. Much will depend upon the real inclination of both sides to reach a lasting settlement, on how far the Iranians are prepared to allow this to happen, and on how much confidence the two sides have in each other's good faith. The RCC appear to be more strongly based than Bazzaz in 1966, and so the situation following the latter's fall is perhaps unlikely to be repeated at least exactly in the same way. The Ba'ath, however, and its ruling clique the RCC, are both exclusive organisations unwilling either to share or relinquish power to any extent, and it is therefore a moot question whether the Kurds will succeed in obtaining the full autonomy and degree of equality which the agreement appears to promise them.

Middle East Section
Research Department
20 March, 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX

Analysis of the 1970 Proposals

1. Language. No change: almost identical with 1966.
2. Participation in the Government. Much the same. The present proposals are slightly more precise.
3. Education and Culture. Much the same: if anything the 1966 version is the more comprehensive and rather less vague.
4. Popular Organisations. No change.
5. Reinstatement of Officials, etc. Much the same.
6. Development Commission. No great difference: the 1970 commission appears to have been given rather greater powers than that proposed in 1966.
7. Economic Plan. Not in the 1966 proposals.
8. Rehabilitation. No change, other than specific mention of Arab as well as Kurdish displacement.
9. Agrarian Reform. Not in the 1966 proposals.
10. Recognition of Kurdish nationality. No change.
11. Appointment of a V/President. Not in the 1966 proposals.
12. Kurdish Autonomy. The 1970 phraseology is more definite and precise than that of 1966. Autonomy is recognised in a fuller and wider sense.
13. Exploitation of national wealth. Not in the 1966 proposals. Has evident reference to oil wealth, and on this the Government has won its point.
14. Representation. No change.
15. Surrender of heavy weapons, etc. Roughly comparable with Point 10 in 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL *Secret*

The most important clause is that (No. 12) in which the Kurds are to be granted autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, which appears to make possible the ^{eventual} establishment of autonomous areas under Kurdish local administration, thereby satisfying the Kurdish demand for a separate Kurdish province.

4. Conclusion

It now remains to be seen whether the agreement can be implemented, or whether, as in 1966, inaction, mistrust and different interpretation of imprecise phraseology will lead to gradual failure. Much will depend upon the real inclination of both sides to reach a lasting settlement, ^{on how far the Ba'athists are prepared to allow this to happen} and how much confidence ^{the two sides} they have in each other's good faith. The RCC appear to be ~~more~~ more strongly based than Bazzaz in 1966, and so the situation following the latter's fall is ^{perhaps} unlikely to be repeated, ^{at least exactly to the same degree.} The Ba'ath, however, and its ruling clique the RCC, are both exclusive organisations unwilling either to share or relinquish power to any extent, and it is therefore a moot question whether the Kurds will succeed in obtaining the full autonomy and degree of equality which the agreement appears to promise them.

Middle East Section
Research Department
20 March, 1970.

- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAL *Secret*

(RR 6/14)

NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE.

(2 April, 1970)

LAST PAPER

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM

The Kurdish Settlement: comparisons between
the 1966 and 1970 Proposals

I. Introductory Background

When Dr. Abdel Rahman Bazzaz became Prime Minister of Iraq in 1965 the Kurdish war had been in progress for some five years, and it was one of his main objectives to bring it to a close as soon as possible. He was unable to take the initiative, however, until after the failure of yet another attempt by the Iraqi army to crush the rebels in the spring of 1966, and it was not until early in June that contacts were made with Barzani and that conditions favourable to talks were established. There were then a number of visits by delegations in which views were exchanged, and finally Barzani sent a message to the Prime Minister in which he indicated a wish to come to terms. Dr. Bazzaz responded by broadcasting on 29 June a programme for "restoration of normal conditions in northern Iraq" which he summarised in twelve main headings (the Twelve Points).

2. The impression created by his declaration was that it was a blueprint for an eventual settlement rather than a settlement in itself, that much of its phraseology was ambiguous and that a great deal had been left unsaid. It was felt, nevertheless, that as long as Bazzaz remained in office there was a fair chance of progress, and the Kurds seemed to be reasonably satisfied with the proposals which Barzani welcomed as contributing towards the achievement of peace. By mid-July, however, a reaction had set in, and the Kurds were becoming increasingly disillusioned by lack of any positive signs of implementation, and when Bazzaz was dismissed on 6 August hopes of a settlement virtually disappeared. The Kurds accused the Government of having gone back on the Bazzaz proposals, difficulties appeared in the reinstatement of Kurdish officers, and the Government dragged its feet over Kurdish local government while for its part suspecting that Barzani was not playing straight over surrender of war material, particularly that captured from the Iraqi army. By October there was a stalemate with no further progress likely. Neither side trusted the other and both made frequent allegations of bad faith by the other. Thereafter the position deteriorated steadily with a gradual relapse into further hostilities. Renewed fighting on a considerable scale was reported in January 1967.

3. The war continued inconclusively into 1970, early in which year it was reported that new contacts had been made with the Kurds in an attempt to reach a settlement. It was known that the Government was increasingly concerned about the morale of the large forces tied down in the north, at the ever increasing expense of the war, and the apparent inability of the Army to force a decision. It was believed, however, that these attempts had been unsuccessful, and the announcement of a settlement on 11 March came as something of a surprise. The proposals published by the Government on 12 March follow those of 1966 fairly closely. Once again a blueprint has been produced: it remains to be seen whether present conditions are more favourable to its implementation than those of 1966.

SECRET

III. Comment

4. Of the fifteen clauses in the 1970 proposals eleven are repetitions, in slightly different form or with slightly different emphasis, of those of 1966 (see Annex). It is reported, however, that the Kurds are satisfied that they are an improvement on 1966, and Barzani is on record as having said that they had secured all their demands saving only their own flag, a fixed share of the oil revenues and representation on the Revolutionary Command Council. He is said also to be hoping for at least four Ministries in a reconstituted Government. It is possible also that there has been agreement on measures not made public, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Iraqi troops, the retention of the Pesh Mergha as a National Guard in the Kurdish areas and the abandonment by the Government of support for Talabani and his followers.

5. The 1970 proposals do appear to be less vague and rather clearer cut than those of 1966, though there is still much in them which is ambiguous. They contain also four clauses which are not in Bazzaz's Twelve Points. Of these that on the exploitation of national wealth makes it clear that the Kurds are not to enjoy the exclusive benefits of oil exploitation in Kurdish areas; the others, dealing with an economic plan, agrarian reform and appointment of a Kurdish V/President do not add up to any great advance on 1970 from the Kurdish point of view. The gain from the latter appointment is likely to be more prestigious than real, agrarian reform has never been an important issue in northern Iraq, and the economic plan will depend entirely on allocation of funds and executive staff.

6. The most important clause is that (No. 12) in which the Kurds are to be granted autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, which appears to make possible the eventual establishment of autonomous areas under Kurdish local administration, thereby satisfying the Kurdish demand for a separate Kurdish province.

IV. Conclusion

7. It now remains to be seen whether the agreement can be implemented, or whether, as in 1966, inaction, mistrust and different interpretation of imprecise phraseology will lead to gradual failure. Much will depend upon the real inclination of both sides to reach a lasting settlement, on how far the Iranians are prepared to allow this to happen, and on how much confidence the two sides have in each other's good faith. The RCC appear to be more strongly based than Bazzaz in 1966, and so the situation following the latter's fall is perhaps unlikely to be repeated at least exactly in the same way. The Ba'ath, however, and its ruling clique the RCC, are both exclusive organisations unwilling either to share or relinquish power to any extent, and it is therefore a moot question whether the Kurds will succeed in obtaining the full autonomy and degree of equality which the agreement appears to promise them.

Middle East Section,
Research Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

1966

Abdel Rahman Bazzaz's Twelve Points

Kurdish to be recognised as an official language side by side with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority, and with Arabic as the language of instruction in those areas. (Bazzaz 3.)

All public offices and appointments open to Kurds on a proportional basis including ministerial, judicial, military and diplomatic posts. (Bazzaz 5.)

Local officials to be Kurds if sufficient available. (Bazzaz 7.)

Kurds to have a fair share of educational grants etc. University of Baghdad to give facilities for study of Kurdish literature, language, etc. (Bazzaz 6.)

Minister to be appointed for supervision of rehabilitation with control of administrative, linguistic and cultural affairs affecting the Kurds. (Bazzaz 11.)

On return of parliamentary life a measure of freedom of expression and political organisation to be permitted within the law. (Bazzaz 8.)

On termination of hostilities and acts of violence all Kurdish officials and employees to be reinstated in their former posts, including also dismissed workers. (Bazzaz 9.)

A special body, answerable to a Minister, to carry out rehabilitation and development, including tourism, tobacco growing and afforestation. (Bazzaz 11.)

II. The Proposals

1970

The Published Terms

- 1. Kurdish language recognised officially on a parity with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority.**
- 2. Acceptance of Kurdish participation in the Government and in all Government departments without discrimination. Officials in Kurdish areas to be Kurds or Kurdish speaking.**
- 3. Educational and cultural services for Kurds to be implemented and expanded.**
- 4. Right of the Kurds to have their own "popular organisations".**
- 5. Reinstatement of all former Kurdish military and civil officials, students and workers.**
- 6. Establishment of a Kurdish development commission with an adequate budget.**

-

Funds now being spent on the war to be devoted to Kurdish rehabilitation. (Baznas 11.)

The Government will endeavour to rehabilitate all individuals and groups in their former places of habitation with a return to the status quo ante as far as possible. (Baznas 12.)

-

Kurdish nationality is recognised by the interim constitution, but to be re-emphasised in the forthcoming permanent constitution. Recognises two main nationalities with equal rights and obligations. (Baznas 1.)

-

Recognition of Kurdish rights by decentralisation to administrative units with wide powers in local and municipal affairs through elected assemblies. (Baznas 2.)

-

Kurds to be represented in the National Assembly on a proportional basis as defined in the new electoral law. (Baznas 4.)

All members of the armed forces and police to report to their units. Other armed bodies will be considered as under Government authority and will hand in their weapons in the course of rehabilitation. (Baznas 10.)

- 7. Preparation of a special economic plan for the Kurdish region.**
- 8. Rehabilitation of Kurds and Arabs driven out or affected by hostilities. Relief measures for housing and employment to be put in hand.**
- 9. The agrarian reform law to be speeded up in Kurdish areas.**
- 10. Amendment of the interim constitution to confirm the existence of two basic nationalities, Arab and Kurd.**
- 11. Appointment of a Kurd as one of the V/Presidents.**
- 12. Measures to be taken to secure Kurdish national rights and autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic.**
- 13. The exploitation of national wealth in the autonomous area to be the responsibility of the Republican authorities.**
- 14. Kurds to have representation in the legislature in ratio to the population figures.**
- 15. The Kurdish broadcasting station and all heavy weapons to be surrendered.**

SECRET

ANNEX

Analysis of the 1970 Proposals

1. Language. No change: almost identical with 1966.
2. Participation in the Government. Much the same. The present proposals are slightly more precise.
3. Education and Culture. Much the same: if anything the 1966 version is the more comprehensive and rather less vague.
4. Popular Organisations. No change.
5. Reinstatement of Officials, etc. Much the same.
6. Development Commission. No great difference: the 1970 commission appears to have been given rather greater powers than that proposed in 1966.
7. Economic Plan. Not in the 1966 proposals.
8. Rehabilitation. No change, other than specific mention of Arab as well as Kurdish displacement.
9. Agrarian Reform. Not in the 1966 proposals.
10. Recognition of Kurdish nationality. No change.
11. Appointment of a V/President. Not in the 1966 proposals.
12. Kurdish Autonomy. The 1970 phraseology is more definite and precise than that of 1966. Autonomy is recognised in a fuller and wider sense.
13. Exploitation of national wealth. Not in the 1966 proposals. Has evident reference to oil wealth, and on this the Government has won its point.
14. Representation. No change.
15. Surrender of heavy weapons, etc. Roughly comparable with Point 10 in 1966.

SECRET

Reference RR 6/14

The Kurdish Settlement

One copy to each of the
following posts please:-

AMMAN
BAGHDAD
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
CAIRO
JEDDAH
KUWAIT
MOSCOW
PARIS
TEHRAN
WASHINGTON

11 copies attached.

M.R. Moore (Mrs)
Research Dept,
Rm 612, Riverwalk

Mr. Forder.



Memorandum, 'The Kurdish Settlement'. Kurdish Settlement In Iraq: Comparisons Between The 1966 And 1970 Proposals. 2 Apr. 1970. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 51/147. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107460232/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=e0961bf8&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.